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Abstract
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firms face unique investment opportunities that arise in their business operations and can be
undertaken at given reservation prices. The cash flows thus generated are not spanned by the
securities traded in the financial market, and cannot be valued uniquely. The intermediary
purchases claims against these cash flows, pools them together, and sells tranches of primary or
secondary securities to the investors.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which projects are undertaken due to
the intermediary’s actions, and firms are amenable to the pool proposed by the intermediary,
compared to the no-investment option or the option of forming alternative pools. We also
determine the structure of the new securities created by the intermediary and identify how
it exploits the arbitrage opportunities available in the market. Our results have implications
for valuation of real investments, synergies among them, and their financing mechanisms. We
illustrate these implications using an example of inventory decisions under random demand.
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1 Introduction
In the standard paradigm of financial economics, the value of a project is derived from capital market
prices based on the twin assumptions that the cash flows from the project can be replicated in the
financial market and that all agents are price-takers with respect to the market for financial claims.
However, firms often have opportunities that are unique to them and generate future cash flows that
cannot be replicated by transactions in the existing securities in the market. Such opportunities
can include capacity expansion, inventory procurement, new product launches, setting up of new
retail stores and supply chain infrastructure, etc. We collectively call such opportunities as real
investments, real assets or projects, since they involve the creation of physical rather than financial
assets.
When markets are incomplete, the value of a real asset cannot always be uniquely computed
using capital market prices, but only bounds can be placed on its present value. Projects whose
values are unambiguously greater than their reservation prices are financed, and those whose values
unambiguously fall below their respective reservation prices are rejected. However, nothing specific
can be said when the reservation price lies between these price bounds. In such cases, do innovations
in capital markets permit investments in real assets that would otherwise not occur because they are
too costly to finance? In other words, do such innovations impact real investment decisions, aside
from providing arbitrage opportunities to the innovators? Our paper addresses these questions.
Three alternative mechanisms may be responsible for the improved attractiveness of projects as
a result of financial innovations. The first is the effect of the innovation on the amelioration of in-
formation asymmetry between the investors and the entrepreneur/manager of the firm. The second
is a reduction in market frictions, such as transaction costs, as a result of the innovation. The third
is through improved matching of the project cash flows to the needs of investors in various states of
the nature, in the context of an incomplete financial market. The first two mechanisms have been
studied in the literature in a variety of models dealing with financial innovation, financial interme-
diation, or securitization. We focus on the third mechanism, which has not been adequately studied
thus far, using the no-arbitrage principle without making explicit assumptions about transaction
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costs or information asymmetry. Moreover, while models in the literature describe innovation in
the context of existing assets owned by firms, we examine its implications for investment in new
real assets.
The specific financial innovation we consider is securitization, although our framework lends
itself to the analysis of other financial innovations, such as venture capital and private equity.
Since its beginning in the 1970s, the phenomenon of securitization is now widespread in financial
markets: mortgages, credit card receivables and various types of corporate debt instruments have
been securitized using a variety of alternative structures. The common feature of these structures
is that an intermediary purchases claims on cash flows issued by various entities, pools these claims
into a portfolio, and then tranches them into marketable securities that cater to the investment
needs of particular clienteles of investors.
To take the example of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the basic structure is that
a financial intermediary sets up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that buys a portfolio of debt
instruments - bonds and/or loans - and adds credit derivatives on individual “names.” This is
referred to as pooling. The SPV then issues various claims against the pooled portfolio, which enjoy
different levels of seniority ranging from a super-senior claim, i.e., a high-grade AAA claim, which
has a negligible probability of not meeting its promised payment, to a medium-grade mezzanine
claim, say rated BBB+, which has a low but non-trivial probability of such default, and finally, to
an equity security, which is viewed as risky. The structuring of claims to match investor tastes and
risk preferences is referred to as tranching and the claims are referred to as tranches.1
In our model, securitization transactions take place among three types of agents, firms, investors,
and financial intermediaries. Firms have opportunities to create unique assets at given reservation
prices, and seek to maximize the time-zero value of these assets. Investors are utility maximizers.
Intermediaries purchase claims from firms that are fully backed by project cash flows, and issue
two types of securities that are sold to investors, those that are within the span of the financial
market (marketable securities), and those that are not spanned by the market (secondary securities).
Throughout our analysis, we assume that all agents are price-takers, i.e., these transactions are not
1This description is a slight simplification of the real structure in practice. See Tavakoli (2003) for details.
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large enough to influence the prices of existing securities traded in the market. In an arbitrage-free
setting, we study whether the transactions undertaken by the intermediary create value for firms
and investors. The value for firms is created by permitting investments in real assets that would not
be undertaken otherwise. The value to investors is created by satisfying demand for consumption
better than by simply trading primary securities in the financial market.
The main results of our paper are as follows. We first consider only pooling. In this setting, the
financial intermediary pools cash flows from the assets of several firms or divisions of a firm, and
issues only such securities as are within the span of the market. Firms may not behave altruistically,
so we allow them to form coalitions with some or all of the other firms in order to seek financing.
Therefore, the outcome of the firms’ decision problem can be modeled as a cooperative game. We
show that the cooperative game results in the creation of a maximal pool of assets. This pool
maximizes the value enhancement provided by pooling, and may or may not consist of all assets
of all firms. We prove a simple condition, given by the set of pricing measures and the cash flows
and reservation prices of new assets, that is necessary and sufficient for a firm to participate in the
game. Thus, we show that pure pooling (sans tranching) can not only provide value enhancement,
but also sustain the synergy through a price mechanism.
We then consider joint pooling and tranching. Through tranching, the intermediary can cus-
tomize securities to the needs of investors. Therefore, we expect pooling and tranching to provide
greater value than pure pooling. We show that the additional value can be characterized using the
structure of securities created by the intermediary. These securities can have up to three compo-
nents; a component that is marketable, a second type that exploits arbitrage opportunities available
in the market due to the intermediary’s special ability to design and sell securities to a subset of
investors, and a third component that is the remainder of the asset pool. The presence or absence
of these three components in the tranching solution has a direct bearing upon the composition of
the asset pool, and therefore, upon value creation due to financing additional projects. We find
that tranching plays a somewhat different role than pooling. While it increases the value of the
projects financed similar to pooling, it could also result in more selective financing. Due to this
effect, the set of viable projects could shrink or expand, when compared to pooling alone.
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Our results imply that the optimal real investment decision of a firm depends on the form of
financing chosen by it. In a complete market, there can be no benefit from pooling and tranching.
The standard approaches of asset pricing and valuation of real options are equivalent to our model
for the pricing of traded assets, but do not show the value of securitization for non-traded assets
in incomplete markets. Thus, the value creation studied in our paper is complementary to the
mechanisms of operational flexibility and operational hedging studied in the operations management
literature since it is based on pricing of non-marketed risks, whereas models of operational flexibility
have generally been studied in the context of a complete market.
Real asset securitization, asset monetization, and off-balance-sheet financing have been used by
many firms in practice. For instance, firms in the pharmaceuticals and credit card industries, as
well as Peoplesoft Corp., General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Company, and Scott Paper Co. have
spun off divisions/subsidiaries as separate companies (Fink (2002), Gorton and Souleles (2005),
Gourdon and Reynolds (2001)). The noted benefits of asset monetization and setting up SPVs
include reduction of debt, reduction of cost of capital, focus on core competency, and increased
ability to invest in additional opportunities. However, these examples relate to selling assets already
owned by a firm or a bank, and thus, do not consider the valuation implications of securitization
on new investments decisions. They also do not consider the optimal composition or the benefits of
pooling and tranching. Our paper focuses on these aspects. Moreover, alternative to securitization,
firms may consider other types of financing for new projects, such as issuance of debt or equity.
Our paper does not evaluate the costs and benefits of these alternative approaches. It only studies
securitization as a form of financing in depth.
This paper is organized as follows: in §2, we review the related literature on incomplete markets
and securitization; in §3, we present the model setup and assumptions; in §4, we analyze the
conditions under which there is value in pooling, and firms willingly participate in the creation of
the asset pool; in §5, we analyze the value in joint pooling and tranching; §6 presents a numerical
example illustrating the results of our paper for a prototypical inventory optimization problem; and
in §7, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the limitations and implications of our analysis.
An appendix compares our model with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and also contains
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all the proofs.
2 Literature Review
Several real investment decisions have been studied in the literature in the areas of operations
management and real options, under varying assumptions on asset pricing. Kogut and Kulatilaka
(1994), Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996) and Kouvelis (1999) investigate the effect of exchange rate
uncertainty in a global production/distribution network; Smith and McCardle (1999) analyze real
options in a multi-period oil drilling project; and Birge (2001) determines value maximization for
a multi-period capacity planning model. All these papers assume market completeness and risk
neutral decision-makers. Another set of papers, Buzacott and Zhang (2004), Li et al. (2005) and
Birge and Xu (2005), characterize the interaction between operational and financial decisions in the
context of market frictions such as bankruptcy and costly debt. Several other papers apply pref-
erence based valuation to study operational and financial hedging for risk-averse decision-makers;
these include Van Mieghem (2003), Gaur and Seshadri (2005), Dong and Liu (2007), and Ding et
al. (2007).
Our paper contributes to this research by examining real investment decisions in incomplete
markets, without making assumptions about market frictions or preference-based valuation. Thus,
in our model, firms face the problem of ambiguous valuation of future cash flows. We study
how pooling and tranching provide value enhancement and affect real investment decisions under
uncertainty. In this way, our paper differs from the literature cited above by considering market
incompleteness as a source of interaction between operational and financial decisions. We show
that market incompleteness affects operational decisions because the value of such decisions may
no longer be additive, and this is a key input for stochastic optimization models.
In the literature on incomplete markets, three approaches have been adopted for pricing con-
tingent claims, through bounds based on no-arbitrage, preference-based approaches that impose
restrictions on the utility functions of consumers, and approximate arbitrage-based arguments. We
apply the first approach, i.e., the arbitrage-based pricing approach of Harrison and Kreps (1979).
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In this approach, the assets whose cash flows are not spanned by the existing market do not have a
unique price, but have price bounds based on the no-arbitrage principle because the pricing mea-
sure is not unique, or equivalently, the investors do not have equal marginal utility growth rates in
all states of nature. Cochrane (2001) calls this approach as the discount factor representation, and
shows that it is equivalent to the beta representation as well as the mean-variance representation.
Thus, we are not advocating only this approach. Indeed, one can derive an alternative formula-
tion of our framework in the other two approaches by imposing additional restrictions on investor
preferences or the reward-to-risk ratio in the market. This would require more assumptions, and
thereby, yield more specific conclusions. By using an arbitrage-free framework, the question we are
able to answer is whether an intermediary can enhance the value by pooling assets from different
firms and tranching them for sale to investors.
Examples of the preference-based approach can be found in the literature on option pricing using
preference restrictions, e.g., Perrakis and Ryan (1984), Levy (1985), Ritchken (1985), Ritchken and
Kuo (1989), and Mathur and Ritchken (1999). In this stream of literature, coherent risk measures
are similar to the valuation approach used by us (Artzner et al. 1999). Examples of the approximate
arbitrage-based approach include Shanken (1992), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), Cochrane and
Saa-Requejo (2000), Bernardo and Ledoit (2000), and Bertsimas et al. (2001). In another approach,
Mayers (1973, 1976) extends the single-period single-factor CAPM framework to the valuation of
non-marketable assets, such as human capital. He shows that the exact valuation of such assets
for an investor introduces into the standard CAPM a second term that measures the correlation of
returns with the non-marketable part of that investor’s portfolio. This and other properties shown
by Mayers are consistent with our model, although they represent particular parameterizations.2
The rationale for the widespread use of securitization in the asset-backed securities market
is largely based on two alternative economic explanations, information asymmetry and market
2In addition, Cerny (1999) studies the minimum martingale measure in the context of no-good-deal bounds
of Bernardo and Ledoit (2000), Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) study the properties of the CAPM in a general
equilibrium in incomplete markets, and Weil (1994) analyzes the CAPM with a non-traded asset similar to Mayers
(1973).
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frictions such as transaction costs. Several researchers have studied the effect of information asym-
metry between issuers and investors in the context of securitization.3 Pooling and tranching of
assets are considered beneficial to both an informed issuer as well as an uninformed investor. The
benefits to the issuer result from reducing the incentive to gather information (Glaeser and Kallal
1997), reducing liquidity costs (DeMarzo and Duffie 1999), and designing low-risk debt securities
that minimize information asymmetry with investors (DeMarzo 2005). The benefits to the investor
result from the ability to split cash flows into a risk-less debt and an equity claim (Gorton and
Pennacchi 1990), and reducing the adverse selection problem (DeMarzo 2005).
The role of transaction costs is less clear as shown by Allen and Gale (1991). They examine the
incentive for a firm to issue a new security in an incomplete market in the presence of transaction
costs. They study the exchange equilibrium that results after the introduction of the new security.
The main finding is that even if a single firm amongst many similar ones innovates, the new security
results in a readjustment of consumption by investors, which, in turn, leads to a change in asset
prices that may benefit similar firms, thus reducing the incentive of any one firm to innovate.
The above papers based on informational asymmetry and transaction costs do not model the
firms’ decisions to invest in new real assets. Instead, they assume that the assets are given on
the balance-sheets of firms. Our paper differs from these streams of literature in this respect. We
study the optimal design of both the pool and the tranches, and assess the effect of securitization
on real investment. Moreover, we examine market incompleteness as the mechanism for value
enhancement.
We draw upon Allen and Gale (1991) by defining the roles of different types of agents analogous
to their paper. However, our research objectives and approach differ from theirs in significant ways.
First, Allen and Gale study the incentives of one firm to innovate, whereas we study securitization
and the role of intermediaries. Second, they allow short sales of new securities by investors in the
3There is an extensive literature on security design in the context of asymmetric information between “insiders”
and investors, which can be traced back to the signalling model proposed by Leland and Pyle (1977). We mention
here only those papers that are directly related to the securitization of claims by pooling and tranching. DeMarzo
and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) provide a more detailed discussion of the broader literature.
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context of a general equilibrium approach. We limit short sales of secondary securities, and apply
a partial equilibrium approach as is standard in asset pricing. Thus, we can obtain more specific
and detailed results, without considering the complex feedback effects that a general equilibrium
analysis would entail. This also enables us to study the effect of intermediation and whether it
helps more firms to undertake investments (or firms to invest in more projects); if investors could
short sell secondary securities, then investors could also intermediate. Therefore, we confine the
financial innovation activity to designated financial intermediaries. Lastly, we use a game-theoretic
setting to ensure participation by firms in the formation of the asset pool.
3 Model Setup
We consider an Arrow-Debreu economy in which time is indexed as 0 and 1. The set of possible
states of nature at time 1 is Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωK}. For convenience, the state at time zero is denoted
as ω0. All agents have the same informational structure: The true state of nature is unknown at
t = 0 and is revealed at t = 1. Moreover, the K states are a complete enumeration of all possible
events of interest, i.e., the subjective probability of any decision-maker is positive for each of these
states and adds up to one when summed over all the states. Our model can be extended to a
multi-period setting with some added complexity in the notation. However, the basic principles
and results derived would still obtain.
3.1 Securities Market
Our pricing assumptions are equivalent to standard models in the literature on asset pricing as
discussed in §2. Identical pricing assumptions are also set out by Ekern and Wilson (1974), Magill
and Quinzii (2002), and Pliska (1997).
We start with a market in which N primary securities are traded via a financial exchange.
Security n has price pn and payoff Sn(ωk) in state k. These securities are issued by firms and pur-
chased by investors through the exchange. The securities market is arbitrage-free and frictionless,
i.e., there are no transaction costs associated with the sale or purchase of securities. To keep the
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analysis uncluttered, cash flows are not discounted, i.e., the risk-free rate of interest is zero.
From standard theory, the absence of arbitrage in the financial market is equivalent to postu-
lating that there exists a set, Θ, of risk neutral pricing measures over Ω under which all traded
securities are uniquely priced, i.e., Eq[Sn] = pn, for all n and for all q ∈ Θ. It is well known that
the set Θ is spanned by a finite set of independent linear pricing measures.4 We label them as
{ql, l = 1, . . . , L}. In particular, when the set Θ is a singleton, the market is complete, else it is
incomplete.
Not every claim can be priced uniquely in an incomplete market. When a claim cannot be
priced uniquely, the standard theory provides bounds for the price of a claim Z that pays Z(ωk)
in state k. Let V −(Z) = max{E[S] : S ≤ Z, S is attainable}, and let V +(Z) = min{E[S] : S ≥
Z, S is attainable}. V −(Z) and V +(Z) are well-defined and finite, and correspond to the lower
and upper bounds on the price of the claim Z on the set Θ. Given that Θ is spanned by a finite
set of independent linear pricing measures labeled {ql, l = 1, . . . , L}, this can be formalized in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) V +(Z) = maxl∈LEql [Z].
(ii) V −(Z) = minl∈LEql [Z].
(iii) If the payoffs from the claim Z(ωk) are non-negative in all states, then these bounds are
unaffected by the inability of agents to short sell securities.
This lemma is needed for several proofs in the Appendix as well as for models in §4 and §5.
3.2 Agents
We consider three types of agents in our model: investors, firms, and intermediaries. Investors are
utility maximizers. Their decision problem is to construct a portfolio of primary securities (subject
to budget constraints), so as to maximize expected utility. Investors can buy or sell primary
4A linear pricing measure is a probability measure that can take a value equal to zero in some states, whereas
a risk neutral probability measure is strictly positive in all states. Thus, the set Θ is the interior of the convex set
spanned by the set of independent linear pricing measures. The maximum dimension of this set equals the dimension
of the solution set to a feasible finite-dimensional linear program, and thus, is finite. See Pliska (1997).
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securities, but cannot issue securities or short secondary securities. Firms own (real) assets and
issue primary securities that are fully backed by the cash flows from these assets. Firms can also
create new assets and sell claims against the cash-flows from these assets to intermediaries.5 They
negotiate with intermediaries to get the highest possible value for their assets that is consistent with
the prices prevailing in the financial market. Intermediaries facilitate transactions between firms
and investors by repackaging the claims purchased from the firms and issuing secondary securities
traded on the over-the-counter securities market.
We stipulate that the claims sold by firms to the intermediaries are fully backed by their asset
cash flows, and the claims issued by the intermediaries are fully backed by the assets purchased
from firms. We do not allow short sales of secondary securities or tranching of primary securities by
intermediaries or investors. These assumptions have a few advantages in our analysis. First, since
there are many reasons for the existence of intermediaries in practice, our assumptions enable us to
isolate the roles of the three types of agents, and explicitly study the phenomenon of securitization
through the intermediaries. Second, they enable us to avoid profits that can arise in an incomplete
market from tranching existing securities. The value creation in our model is instead due to the cash
flows of new projects. This matches the construction of standard asset-backed CDOs, as opposed
to synthetic CDOs. With synthetic CDOs, there can be an opportunity to complete the market,
leading to a new equilibrium, in which no specific conclusions about value creation can be obtained.
In our model, secondary securities cannot be sold short, and we apply the “small firm” argument.
Thus, the creation of secondary securities has a negligible effect on the prices of primary securities,
and we avoid getting into the computation of a new general equilibrium.6 A third reason for these
5The new assets created by firms may also include assets that are already in place, but not yet securitized. For
example, the loans made by a bank that are presently held on the asset side of its balance sheet may be candidates
for securitization in a collateralized loan obligations structure. The bank would be a “firm” in the context of our
model. In these cases, of course, the decision to acquire the assets in question has already been made and, to that
extent, part of the analysis in this paper would not apply directly.
6In practice, borrowing and shorting secondary securities would require a liquid market for borrowing and lending
in these securities, with modest transaction costs. Such a market might not exist particularly since the tranches are
“bespoke,” making it difficult to engage in short sales of illiquid securities.
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assumptions is to avoid transactions that permit default in some states, because that would lead
to complex questions relating to bankruptcy and renegotiation, which are outside the purview of
this paper.
We describe the decision making problems of the various agents as below:
Investors: We model investors by classifying them into a finite set of investor types denoted I. The
utility derived by type i investors is given by a von Neumann-Morgenstern function Ui : <×< → <+.
Ui is assumed to be concave, strictly increasing, and bounded above. Investors maximize their
expected utility subject to the constraint that consumption is non-negative in every state.
For each type i investor in state k, let ei(ωk) denote the investor’s endowment, xik denote the
consumption, and Pi(ωk) be the subjective probability of state k. Also, let the portfolio of primary
securities held by a type i investor be denoted as the N -tuple of real numbers (αi1, αi2, . . . , αiN ),
where αin is the amount of security n in the portfolio. The investor derives expected utility equal
to
∑K
k=0 Pi(ωk)Ui(xi0, xik). The type i investor’s decision problem can be written as
max
{∑K
k=0 Pi(ωk)Ui(xi0, xik) :
xik = ei(ωk) +
∑N
n=1 αinSn(ωk), ∀ k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
xi0 = ei(ω0)−
∑N
n=1 αinp(n), xik ≥ 0, ∀ k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K.
}
The first constraint equates the consumption in each state at time 1 with the cash flow provided
by the portfolio and the endowment. The second specifies the budget constraint for investment in
primary securities at time 0. The third constraint specifies that the cash flow in each state at time
1 should be non-negative.
We denote the derivatives of Ui with respect to xi0 and xik, k ≥ 1, as Ui1 and Ui2, respectively.
We shall assume, as customary, that the current period consumption is strictly bounded away from
zero for investor types. It follows that, at optimality,
K∑
k=1
Pi(ωk)
Ui2(xi0, xik)∑K
k=1 Pi(ωk)Ui1(xi0, xik)
Sn(ωk) ≤ pn.
Here, we obtain an inequality because of the restriction on consumption. The choice of the zero for
the minimum consumption level is arbitrary, and could be changed to any other level of consumption
that an investor type is loathe to fall below. The same effect is produced by short sales restrictions
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placed on individual investors. The inequality suggests that, in state k, type i investors are willing
to buy an infinitesimal amount of consumption at a price, mik given by
mik = Pi(ωk)
Ui2(xi0, xik)∑K
k=1 Pi(ωk)Ui1(xi0, xik)
.
These values are called the (personal) state prices of investors. We require that each security
is present in the optimal portfolio of at least one investor type. If no restrictions are placed on
consumption levels or short sales of primary securities, then the state prices of each investor type
will belong to the set Θ.
Due to market incompleteness, the state prices for an unspanned state may differ amongst
investor types. An investor of type i is willing to buy not only consumption that is specific to state
k, but also secondary securities issued by the intermediary if the price of the secondary security is
below that given by valuing its state dependent cash flows, using the investor’s state prices. We
require at least two investor types in our model, otherwise the state prices of all investors will be
identical and will give a single pricing measure even though the market is incomplete; see Cochrane
(2001: Chapter 3) for a discussion of investors’ state prices and risk-neutral pricing measures. We
do not require the set of investor types to be fully specified or the intermediary to have access to
all investor types.
Firms: Let J denote the number of firms that wish to undertake investment projects at time 0.
Each firm maximizes the time 0 expected value of its investments. Firm j can create an asset Xj
that is unique to it. The asset provides a positive cash flow of Xj(ωk) in each state k, at time
t = 1. The firm can sell claims issued against Xj to the intermediary. Recall that we require that
claims issued against Xj should be fully backed by Xj ; in other words, the sum promised should
not exceed the cash flow from Xj in any state of nature. We assume that firm j has a reservation
price rj on Xj . The reservation price is exogenous. It includes financial, physical, and transaction
costs incurred at time 0, such as due to use of labor inputs for implementing the new project.
It could also include opportunity costs of the key decision-makers of the firm that are required to
create the asset. The firm invests in the asset if the net present value, determined by subtracting its
reservation price from the selling price of future cash flows offered by the intermediary, is positive.
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Note that, in incomplete markets, the firm’s objective is unclear because it is difficult to concep-
tualize unanimity of shareholders in valuing future cash flows.7 Our use of securitization resolves
this problem because the price offered by the intermediary for the cash flows from the asset is paid
at time 0.
We assume that the total cash flow available from this set of firms in any state k,
∑J
j=1Xj(ωk),
is small relative to the size of the economy. Each firm, therefore, behaves as a price-taker in
the securities market. However, when the asset cannot be priced precisely, it negotiates with the
intermediary for obtaining the highest possible price for securitization of the asset. In the rest of
this paper, we use Xj to refer to both the j-th asset and the cash flows from the j-th asset.
Intermediaries: Intermediaries are agents who have knowledge about the firms’ and investors’
asset requirements. Such knowledge is different from receiving a private signal regarding the future
outcome. Hence, intermediaries have no superior information about future cash flows, relative to
other agents in the economy. The intermediaries purchase assets from firms and repackage them
to sell to investors. They seek to exploit price enhancement through securitization operations that
increase the spanning of available securities. They use this superior ability to negotiate with the
firms for the prices of their assets. They use the knowledge about the investors’ preferences to create
new claims and price them correctly. An important aspect of the model is that intermediaries act
fairly by paying the same price for the same asset, independent of which firm is selling it to the
pool, and charging the same price for the same product even though it is sold to different customers.
The rationale for these fairness requirements is the possibility of entry and competition from other
intermediaries. However, we do not explicitly model competition amongst intermediaries beyond
imposing the fairness requirements and the participation constraints by firms that are discussed in
the next section. Hence, in what follows, we consider the securitization problem from the viewpoint
of a single intermediary.
The intermediary purchases claims from firms, pools them, and packages them into different
7See Magill and Quinzii (2002: Chapter 6). The project is new and is not included in the stock price of the firm.
Its value will further depend on the type of financing and the benefits of pooling and tranching, which we seek to
determine.
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tranches, and sells them as collateralized secondary securities. Pooling is defined as combining the
cash flows from claims issued by different firms in a proportion determined by the intermediary.
We do not restrict the intermediary to purchasing only all or none of a firm’s cash flows. Instead,
it can purchase fractions (between 0 and 1) of the available assets. Our results show conditions in
which different types of pooling solutions are obtained. Tranching is defined as splitting the pooled
asset into sub-portfolios to be sold to different groups of investors, with the constraint that the
sub-portfolios be fully collateralized, i.e., fully backed by the claims purchased from the firms. We
assume that the intermediary can sell secondary securities to investors in a subset of the investor
classes, which is denoted as I1 ⊂ I.
Securitization naturally leads to the problem of moral hazard since firms may not have the
incentive to service the cash flows that they have sold to the intermediary. This issue is addressed
in the literature on information asymmetry, such as in DeMarzo (2005). The same results apply
to our model as well, for example, if the firm and/or the intermediary retain an equity tranche
themselves.
4 Value of Pooling
We attribute the beneficial role played by the intermediary to two factors: the value enhancement
provided by pooling alone, and the value provided by tranching. This section considers the former.
We analyze the problem of pooling the cash flows of some or all projects in the available set and
valuing the pooled asset by replicating its cash flows in the securities market. We use the lower
bound, V −(·), as a measure of value, and thus, compute the lowest price at which the pooled
asset can be sold without presenting opportunities for arbitrage. There are several reasons to take
the minimum value representation, V −(·), as a measure of value: First, it is the price at which
the claim can be sold for sure in the market without assuming any knowledge about investors’
preferences and state prices. Second, using V −(·) minimizes the problem of adverse selection since
the individual valuations cannot do worse than the minimum even with adverse selection (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995:p.436). Third, V −(·) is a transparent measure of value since it is consistent with
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the prices of primary (traded) securities and can be computed by all agents in the market using
knowledge of prices of primary securities alone. Fourth, the value of the marketable portion of the
asset pool is unambiguous and the choice of V −(·) only affects the valuation of cash flows outside
the span of the market. Moreover, the conditions under which pooling can create value do not
depend on the use of V −(·). Of course, a price higher than V −(·) is possible when preferences and
state prices are known at least for a subset of investors. In §6, we address how such higher value
can be realized by solving the tranching problem.
Consider any given firm j. If rj ≤ V −(Xj), then clearly, firm j can profitably invest in asset Xj ,
even without pooling. If rj ≥ V +(Xj), then it does not make sense for the firm to invest in the asset
Xj . The interesting case is the one where V +(Xj) ≥ rj ≥ V −(Xj), because, in this case, the basis
for the decision to invest in Xj is ambiguous. To define the value of pooling, suppose that a pooled
asset is created with cash flows X(ωk) =
∑
j Xj(ωk) for all k. Clearly, V
−(X) ≥ ∑j V −(Xj).8
However, it is important to note that this inequality is not sufficient to determine the value of
pooling. We still need to consider the reservation prices of firms to determine if pooling reduces
the ambiguity regarding investment in assets. We postulate that there is value to pooling in this
latter sense if there is a linear combination of assets with weight 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 for asset j such
that V −(
∑
j(αjXj)) ≥
∑
j(αjrj) and αj > 0 for at least one firm j for which V
−(Xj) < rj .
Another way of defining this type of value creation is that the set of projects fully or partially
financed from payments derived from the asset pool is larger than the set of such projects prior
to pooling. Furthermore, in our formulation, firms need not behave altruistically in creating the
asset pool; therefore, as an additional condition for value creation, we require that firms should
have an incentive to pool their assets only when they cannot benefit, individually or severally, from
breaking away from the pool.
Theorem 1 shows the necessary condition for creating value through pooling. The rest of the
section determines sufficient conditions for value creation.
8The left hand side is given by minimizing the sum of the cash flows from all assets over the set of probability
measures, whereas the right hand side is the sum of the minimum of each individual cash flow. The minimum of the
sum is always larger than or equal to the sum of minimums.
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Theorem 1. (i) If there is a q ∈ Θ such that rj ≥ Eq[Xj ] ∀ j, then value cannot be created by
pooling the Xj’s.
(ii) Conversely, if there is no q ∈ Θ such that rj ≥ Eq[Xj ] ∀ j, then value can be created by
pooling the Xj’s.
The first part of the theorem states that if the reservation price for each asset is higher than its
value under a common pricing measure, then additional value cannot be created through pooling.
Conversely, if the condition in part (i) of the theorem fails to hold, then part (ii) states the positive
part of the result, that is, there exists a vector of weights (αj) such that pooling leads to value
enhancement. However, αj need not be unique. For ease of presentation, we initially assume that
the condition in Theorem 1(ii) holds for αj = 1 for all j, i.e., there is value in pooling all the cash
flows from all firms. We first present all the results under this assumption. Then, we generalize
them to the case when the condition in Theorem 1(ii) holds, but necessarily with 0 < αj < 1 to
create value by pooling.
As mentioned before, even when the value of the pooled asset exceeds the sum of the reservation
prices, some firms might be unwilling to participate in the asset pool. This could happen, for
example, if one firm has a very high reservation price, so that the remaining firms are better off
keeping it out of the pool. This naturally leads to the following set of questions: Can we characterize
reservation prices such that there is an incentive for firms to pool their assets? Can a fair price be
set for each Xj? How many asset pools would be created and what would be the composition of
these asset pools? The remainder of this section answers these questions.
We stipulate that firms will participate in the pool only if they cannot do better by forming
sub-coalitions amongst themselves. We, therefore, model the firms’ participation problem as a
cooperative game, G (Owen 1995). Let Jw denote a subset of the set of all firms, J , wherein
each firm j contributes a fraction wj ∈ [0, 1] of its cash flows with proportional reservation price
wjrj . Let Jcw = J − Jw denote the complement of Jw, wherein the contribution of each firm j
is (1 − wj)Xj and reservation price is (1 − wj)rj . Also let X(Jw) =
∑
j∈Jw wjXj . We consider
the cooperative game in which the value of each coalition, V (Jw), is defined as V −(X(Jw)). In
this game, we allow coalition formation with fractional assets being pooled together. Following
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standard terminology for cooperative games, we say that there is a solution to this game, i.e., its
core is non-empty, if the grand coalition of all firms cannot be blocked. The theorem below provides
sufficient conditions for the core of the game to be non-empty, as well as conditions that guarantee
that payments can be made to the firms to cover their reservation prices. These results can be
related to the arguments for pooling presented in the context of information asymmetry by Leland
and Pyle (1977), Subrahmanyam (1991), and especially DeMarzo (2005). In these papers, the
benefits from pooling arise from a reduction in adverse selection costs and improvement in liquidity
due to pooling. In our case, the benefits from pooling arise from the exploitation of arbitrage that
occurs even after compensating the particular firms for their reservation prices. Both arguments
complement each other in explaining real world applications of pooling.
Theorem 2. (i) If rj ≤ V −(Xj) for all j, then the core of game G is not empty.
(ii) There is a solution in the core to G such that the payments to all firms exceed their reser-
vation prices if and only if for every subset Jw of J , we have V (J) ≥ max(V (Jw),
∑
j∈Jw wjrj) +
max(V (Jcw),
∑
j∈Jcw(1− wj)rj).
The first part of this theorem follows from a proof in Owen (1975). In the context of securitiza-
tion, we infer from this result that even when the reservation prices are so small that projects can
be financed without pooling, there may still be incentive to create the pool and share the benefits.
When the reservation prices are larger, Theorem 2(ii) states that the necessary condition for the
payments to firms to support the core is also sufficient to guarantee its existence. The necessary
part of Theorem 2(ii) is immediate, because under every solution in the core, each coalition Jw
should get at least max(V (Jw),
∑
j∈Jw wjrj). If this condition does not hold, then either some
coalition does not get its value (and can do better on its own) or the payment to the firms in some
coalition cannot cover the sum of the reservation prices. The sufficiency part uses a different argu-
ment and is new. It shows that when the condition holds for all possible Jw, all firms participate
and all projects are financed in full. Notice that we do not need to verify the condition in Theorem
2(ii) for all possible partitions of J . Instead, verifying the condition for partitions of size two is
sufficient.
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Notice also that the inequalities in Theorem 2(ii) must be tested not only for partitions with
wj = 0 or 1 for all j, but also those with fractional values of wj , i.e., partitions where a firm belongs
to two or more subsets and divides its cash flows between them. This continuum of partitions makes
it virtually impossible to use Theorem 2(ii) directly in practice to determine the composition of the
asset pool. However, this task can be avoided. We show that there is a simple condition that is
necessary and sufficient for all the inequalities in 2(ii) to be satisfied. Thus, under this condition,
the cash flows from each asset Xj are included fully in the pool and the core of the cooperative
game is not empty.
Theorem 3. Let q ∈ Θ be a pricing measure under which ∑j Eq[Xj ] = V −(∑j Xj). If Eq[Xj ] ≥ rj
for all j and some such q, then the sufficiency conditions in Theorem 2(ii) are satisfied. The
converse is also true.
We remark on the symmetry between this result and Theorem 1(i). The result in Theorem 1(i)
is that if, under a common pricing measure, each asset’s value is less than its reservation price then
there is no value in pooling. The new result is that if, under a pricing measure that minimizes the
value of the asset pool, the value of each asset equals or exceeds its reservation price then value can
be created unambiguously by pooling all assets. Value is also created (in the sense that additional
projects are undertaken) if some project whose value was below the reservation price gets financed
through the pooling effect.
While Theorems 2 and 3 show that there exist payment schemes such that firms are willing to
participate in the game G, we need to address the question of actually determining the payment
scheme to the firms, which we now turn to. It is possible to show that there could be many such
schemes, but we also require the scheme to be “fair.” It is difficult to work with the concept of
“fairness” in complete generality. However, a case can be made that if all firms are paid the same
price for a unit cash flow in state k, then the scheme is fair. We therefore restrict ourselves to
payments determined using a linear pricing measure. The following corollary complements the
results so far by using the sufficient condition of Theorem 3 to construct a linear pricing scheme.
Corollary 1. If a pricing measure qp exists that is either an extreme point of the set of risk
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neutral probability measures, or a convex combination of such extreme points, such that
∑
j EqpXj =
V −(
∑
j Xj), and the reservation prices satisfy rj ≤ EqpXj, then the grand coalition of all firms can
be sustained when firm j is paid EqpXj.
Corollary 1 implies that pooling creates value from two perspectives. The first is given by the
change in the pricing measure that is necessary to value the assets correctly. Suppose that firm j
cannot decide whether to invest in the project based on the minimum valuation, i.e., rj ≥ V −[Xj ] =
Eqj [Xj ], where qj is the pricing measure that gives the lower bound on the value of firm j’s asset,
and depends on the cash flow of the asset. From Corollary 1, the measure qp to determine the
value when the project is considered to be part of the asset pool depends on the cash flow of the
entire asset pool. The use of this measure yields a higher value for each project. Thus, firm j
surely gains when the reservation price lies within these two bounds. The second perspective is
that more projects are financed than without pooling. When we are restricted to compensate firms
using the same pricing measure, we are assured that the gain from pooling can be used to induce
all firms to participate when rj ≤ EqpXj . There are other interesting aspects to the corollary. The
pricing scheme is fair because it uses the same pricing formula for each firm. It also prices the
traded securities correctly. Thus, firms can use a market benchmark to assure themselves that the
intermediary is fair.
The above results characterize the situations in which all firms participate and contribute all
their assets. A critical condition for full participation by firms is Eqp(Xj) ≥ rj for all j and qp
as defined in Corollary 1. However, note that according to Theorem 1, there are situations where
there is value in pooling only fractions of cash flows of the firms. Further, the value of {αj} for
each firm j that provides value in pooling may not be unique. The following corollary highlights
one such solution. We show that there exists an optimal value of {αj} for each j, denoted {α∗j},
that maximizes the value of the pool. Further, if we treat α∗jXj ’s as the constituent assets instead
of Xj ’s, then Theorems 2 and 3 still apply to this asset pool.
Corollary 2. If the condition in Theorem 1(ii) holds, then the value of pooling is maximized by
solving the linear program: maxV −(
∑
j αj(Xj))−
∑
j αjrj, subject to 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1, ∀j. An optimal
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solution to this linear program, α∗j for all j, is in the core of G. The assets of firms whose value
exceeds their respective reservation price will be included fully in this asset pool. Moreover, the cash
flows left over, {(1− α∗j )Xj}, do not provide any value in pooling.
Corollary 2 is consistent with Theorem 3, because if Eqp [Xj ] ≥ rj for all j, then it can be shown
that setting α∗j = 1 for all j gives an optimal solution to the linear program in Corollary 2. When
some α∗j is fractional, it is difficult to construct a fair payment scheme, because it simultaneously
requires limiting the fraction of assets purchased at that price. Moreover, value creation from both
perspectives is possible, but, it is difficult to separate out the benefits given by the formation of
the pool from those due to securitization.
In summary, this section characterizes the value in pooling. Theorem 1(i) and (ii) show the
conditions under which there is no value in pooling, and those under which there is such value. In
the latter case, Theorems 2 and 3 and Corollary 2 together show that there is a maximal coalition
that can be sustained. This coalition achieves the maximum value of pooling. It includes all
the assets when the condition in Theorem 3 holds, and fractional assets otherwise. Corollary 1
guarantees the existence of a linear payment scheme for this coalition. The assets not included in
this coalition cannot be reconstituted as a separate value enhancing pool. The value creation comes
about due to synergies in cash flows amongst assets as viewed from the market prices of primary
securities. The value-maximizing behavior of a firm or a subset of firms does not impede the correct
(value maximizing) pool from forming. Thus, intermediation and pooling are predictable outcomes,
without reference to the preferences of individual agents.
5 Value of Pooling and Tranching
In this section, we assume that, in addition to tranches that are replicas of primary securities
already traded in the securities market, the intermediary can also create and sell new securities,
fully backed by the pool of assets, directly to investors. We call the former marketable tranches, and
the latter non-marketable tranches or secondary securities. If the sum of the prices of marketable
tranches (which are unique) and the prices of non-marketable tranche (which are obtained by selling
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each tranche at investor-specific state prices mik) exceeds the value obtained by pure pooling, then
we shall conclude that tranching provides value enhancement beyond pure pooling.
In general, the cash flows from a given asset pool, say,
∑
j wjXj can be split into several
tranches, and each tranche offered to every investor type. Recall that mik denotes the state price
of investor type i, for a unit consumption in state k. Let
m∗k = max
i∈I1
mik. (1)
where I1 is the subset of investor classes to whom the intermediary can sell secondary securities.
It is clear that the cash flow in state k should be sold to the investor type that values it the most.
Therefore, the maximum price that the intermediary expects from a tranche sold in state k is m∗k.
Thus, we do not use V −(·) as the valuation criterion. Instead, the set of investors about whom the
intermediary has information provides the valuation criterion. We first derive the optimal tranching
solution for a given asset pool. Later on, we examine whether the additional ability to tranche the
pool, in turn, influences the choice of the asset pool in the first place.
Given the asset pool, we formulate the problem of designing the optimal tranches that maximize
the value of the asset pool as follows:
V T (J) = max
∑
k
m∗k(Yk − lk) +
∑
n
pnβn (2)
such that
Yk +
∑
n
βnSn(ωk) ≤
∑
j∈J
wjXj(ωk) for all k (3)∑
n
βnSn(ωk) + lk ≥ 0, for all k (4)
Yk, lk ≥ 0, βn unrestricted for all k, n. (5)
Here, βn is the weight of primary security n in the marketable tranche, lk equals the amount
of negative cash flow from the marketable tranche in state k, and Yk − lk is the cash flow of
the non-marketable tranche in state k. The objective is to maximize the combined value of the
tranches. The objective function removes the cash flow, lk, from the intermediary’s profits to
prevent the intermediary from exploiting any arbitrage opportunities available in the market by
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tranching primary securities. Constraints (3)-(4) specify that the tranches should be fully backed
only by the asset pool. In constraint (3), we state that the sum of cash flows of the tranches must
be less than the cash flow of the asset pool in each state k. In constraint (4), we preclude the
possibility that the intermediary may short primary securities and use the proceeds to create a
new non-marketable tranche. This formulation captures the constraint placed on SPV’s that any
security issued by an SPV should be backed by the asset pool and not from any market operation.9
Finally, the non-negativity constraints on Yk in (5) specify that short sales of secondary securities
are not allowed, i.e., the non-marketable tranche should only have positive components. This is
justified by recalling that consumption should be non-negative in all states.
The optimal tranching results are based on the dual of (2)-(5) formulated as below:
DT (J) = min
∑
k
λk
∑
j∈J
wjXj(ωk) (6)
such that
λk ≥ m∗k for all k (7)
δk ≤ m∗k for all k (8)∑
k
(λk − δk)Sn(ωk) = pn for all n (9)
λk, δk ≥ 0, for all k. (10)
Here, λk and δk are the dual variables corresponding to constraints (3) and (4), respectively, of
the primal problem. The dual program’s objective function states that λk are the state prices that
determine the optimal value of the asset pool realized by tranching. Constraint (9) implies that
(λ1 − δ1, . . . , λK − δK) ∈ Θ because this vector is non-negative and prices all primary securities
correctly. Thus, δk measure the distance of the state prices obtained by allowing tranching from
the set Θ. Let Ωa be the set of states in which δk > 0 in the optimal dual solution.
The following lemma formally states that the optimal solution of the dual problem lies in
a bounded region, and therefore, by implication, the primal problem does not lead to infinite
9A less stringent constraint, allowing for partial use of the proceeds of the short sales of primary securities to
augment the pool, would expand the feasible set. However, this would only introduce a somewhat different shadow
price, but would be qualitatively similar to the rest of the analysis presented here.
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arbitrage (see the Fundamental Duality Theorem, Murty (1983:p.192)). The lemma shows that we
preclude the intermediary from issuing new secondary securities by short selling primary securities,
and thus, taking advantage of arbitrage in an obvious way. For the purposes of this lemma, let
SDT be the set of feasible solutions to the dual program, and B be a bounded polyhedral convex
set defined as
∏
k[0,max(1,maxkm
∗
k)]× [0,max(1,maxkm∗k)].
Lemma 2. The optimal solution to the dual problem is obtained by computing the value of the
asset pool at each extreme point of B⋂SDT and taking the minimum value as the solution.
From this lemma, the primal problem V T (J) has a finite optimal solution. Therefore, the
tranching solution exploits only those arbitrage opportunities in the securities market that are
available to the intermediary due to the access to the asset pool and the subset of investors I1. It
does not include possible arbitrage opportunities that may exist in the market due to discrepancies
between the prices of primary securities in the market and the secondary securities demanded by
investors.10 The following theorem defines such opportunities and shows that they are completely
characterized by the set Ωa.
Theorem 4. (i) If there exists a non-negative contingent claim Z such that
∑
k′m
∗
k′Z(ω
′
k) >
V +(Z), then there is no feasible solution to the dual in Θ. In particular, Ωa is not empty.
(ii) If there exists a non-negative contingent claim Z such that
∑
k′m
∗
k′Z(ω
′
k) > V
+(Z), then
Z is strictly positive in some state k ∈ Ωa.
(iii) If Ωa 6= ∅, then there exists a non-negative contingent claim Z that is strictly positive in
some state(s) k ∈ Ωa and zero elsewhere, such that ∑k′m∗k′Z(ω′k) > V +(Z).
(iv) If there exists a non-negative contingent claim Z such that
∑
k′m
∗
k′Z(ω
′
k) > V
+(Z), then
there does not exist any q ∈ Θ such that qk ≥ m∗k for all k.
Theorem 4(i)-(ii) show that contingent claims that present arbitrage with the given subset of
investors must have positive cash flows in one or more states in the set Ωa. The intermediary
can short primary securities to create a contingent claim that pays off in these states and sell the
10This is in line with the argument of DeMarzo (2005) that incomplete markets may not explain the securitization
of existing marketable assets.
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tranches to the subset of investors to realize an immediate profit. This is the consequence of the
value to the investors exceeding V +(Z). Note that part (ii) also implies that if a claim does not
have positive cash flows in any of the states in Ωa, then the upper bound on the price of the claim
exceeds the value to the subset of investors. Theorem 4(iii) strengthens the role of the set Ωa. It
states that if Ωa is non-empty, then there is a non-negative contingent claim with cash flows in this
set of states only, whose value to investors exceeds V +(Z). The last part of Theorem 4 is the dual
characterization which is mathematically the most useful of the three. Using this result, we can
now state the general structure of the secondary securities.
Let Y ∗k , l
∗
k, and β
∗
n denote the optimal solution to the primal problem, and λ
∗
k and δ
∗
k denote
the optimal solution to the dual problem. We partition the optimal tranching solution into three
parts that we denote as T a, T I and Tm. Let T ak = Y
∗
k − l∗k if δ∗k > 0 and zero otherwise, let
T Ik = Y
∗
k − l∗k − T ak , and let Tmk =
∑
n βnSn(ωk). Here, T
m is the marketable tranche, T a consists
of the cash flows of the non-marketable tranche in states belonging to the set Ωa, and T I consists
of the cash flows of the non-marketable tranche in the remaining states. We partition the non-
marketable tranche in this manner by applying the complementary slackness property (Murty
1983:p.197). By this property, δ∗k > 0 implies that l
∗
k+
∑
n β
∗
nSn(ωk) = 0, which further implies that
Y ∗k − l∗k =
∑
j wjXj(ωk), i.e., all the cash flows in state k are sold as secondary securities. Thus,
according to Theorem 4, T a is based on exploiting the arbitrage opportunities in the securities
market due to the ability to design and sell secondary securities to a subset of investors, while Tm
and T I are not based on the existence of arbitrage. T a is zero if there are no arbitrage opportunities
available to the intermediary.
Note that the complementary slackness property also implies that the intermediary tranches all
of the cash flows in the asset pool in the states belonging to the set Ωa in the form of T a. Indeed,
we have Ta · Tm = 0 and Ta · TI = 0. Thus, the optimal solution to the primal problem V T (J) is
separable into one that corresponds to the tranches Ta and another that corresponds to the rest.
The value of T a is independent of changes in the cash flows of the asset pool in states Ω \Ωa, and
likewise, the values of Tm and T I are independent of the cash flows in states Ωa. To see this, define
X̂(ωk) =
∑
j wjXj(ωk)− T ak as the asset pool after tranching T a. Set m̂∗k = 0 for the states where
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δ∗k > 0, and m̂
∗
k = m
∗
k otherwise. Let D̂
T denote the new dual problem. Clearly, D̂T has a feasible
solution in Θ. Due to the fact that T a is orthogonal to Tm and T I , the optimal solution to DT is
given by Tm and T I . Thus, the values of Tm and T I are independent of the value of T a. Therefore,
the asset pool decomposes into an ‘arbitrage part’, a marketable part and a residual part. In the
terminology of the securitization industry, roughly speaking, the first component can be referred
to as a “bespoke” tranche, the second one as a super-senior tranche, and the last one as the equity
tranche.
We can now specify the complete structure of the optimal tranching solution for a given asset
pool as stated in the theorem below. This theorem uses the results of Theorem 4 to show the
conditions under which the different tranches come about.
Theorem 5. The optimal solution to the tranching problem is represented by (T a, Tm, T I) as
defined above. Further,
(i) If there exists q ∈ Θ such that qk ≥ m∗k for all k, then T a ≡ 0.
(ii) If there exists q ∈ Θ such that qk ≤ m∗k for all k and qk < m∗k for some k, then there exists
an optimal tranching solution in which Tm = T I ≡ 0.
(iii) Otherwise all three types of tranches may occur in the optimal solution.
We note from Theorem 5 that the differences among the three types of solutions to the tranching
problem do not depend on the cash flows in the asset pool, but only on the set Θ and the state
prices m∗k. Thus, an intermediary can verify the results in Theorems 4-5 without knowing the
cash flows in the asset pool or the willingness of individual firms to participate in the asset pool.
Further, the tranches in Tm might be bought by a different set of investors than I1, which is the
set of investors that buys tranches T a and T I .
Theorem 5 also clearly delineates the incremental value realized by tranching the given asset
pool
∑
j wjXj . In case (i), λ
∗ ∈ Θ, and thus, the optimal solution to the dual problem lies inside
the price bounds V −(
∑
j wjXj) and V
+(
∑
j wjXj). By the constraints of the dual problem, this
solution is obtained in the set Θ
⋂{(λ1, . . . , λK) : λk ≥ m∗k for all k}. Since this is a subset of Θ,
pooling and tranching provides incremental value beyond V −(
∑
j wjXj). In case (ii), the optimal
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solution is given by Em∗ [T a], which is greater than V +(T a). In case (iii), the value of tranches Tm
and T I is as in case (i) and the value of tranche T a is as in case (ii). Due to the orthogonality of
T a with Tm and T I , the total value is equal to the sum of these two components. Thus, the value
from pooling and tranching is higher than V −(
∑
j wjXj).
Thus far in this section, we have presented results for a given asset pool. We now examine the
implications of tranching on the formation of the asset pool. First, note that the optimal value
created through pooling and tranching will always be at least as large as that from pure pooling.
However, the asset pool that maximizes the value from pooling and tranching may not be the same
as that which maximizes the value from pure pooling. This naturally gives rise to questions whether
the optimal asset pool under pooling and tranching will be larger than that under pure pooling,
and whether it will include all the assets in the latter pool. We examine these questions for each
case in Theorem 5.
In case (i), all results of §4 apply if attention is restricted to the smaller set of pricing measures
ΘT = {q : qk ≥ m∗k, q ∈ Θ}. Thus, using the inferences in §4, the asset pool may consist of cash
flows from the individual firms in fractions or in full. Further, the mix of projects that get financed
may change compared to the solution in §4, however, the total value of the projects financed will
always increase. Note that, in this case, the minimum value actually corresponds to selling the
assets to the restricted set of investors in a particular way with the unsold part having no value
to those investors. In case (ii), the optimal solution is linear in the cash flows X(ωk). Thus, the
solution degenerates into a pure tranching solution and there is value from tranching, but there
may not be value from pooling. The decision for each firm to go through the intermediary is made
separately based on whether Em∗ [Xj ] ≥ rj or not. Thus, each firm either participates in the pool
in full or not at all. The mix of projects financed may again change compared to §4, however,
there will be no fractional pooling in this case. In case (iii), the pooling and tranching solution lies
outside the set Θ. The remaining implications in this case are the same as in case (i). Thus, we
obtain the counter-intuitive conclusion that the optimal asset pool in pooling and tranching may
not include all the assets included in pure pooling, and may in fact be smaller than the latter.
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6 Numerical Example
We illustrate the insights from our model, focusing on the role of reservation prices of potential new
assets in determining the optimal pooling and tranching solution, its sustainability, and its effect
on real investment. The example of a real investment decision we consider is an inventory decision
with random demand.
Suppose that there are four states of nature at time 1 denoted Ω = {ω1, . . . , ω4}, and there are
two primary securities in the financial market with payoffs S1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and S2 = (1, 0, 0.5, 1.5)
at time 1 and prices p1 = p2 = 1 at time 0. The set of risk neutral pricing measures over Ω is
Θ = {(x + 3y, x − y, 0.5 − 2x, 0.5 − 2y)}⋂[0, 1]4 with two degrees of freedom denoted x and y.
The set Θ is spanned by three linear pricing measures, Q1 = (0, 1/3, 0, 2/3), Q2 = (1, 0, 0, 0), and
Q3 = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2). Q1 corresponds to x = 1/4, y = −1/12, Q2 corresponds to x = 1/4, y = 1/4
and Q3 corresponds to x = 0, y = 0.
Consider two investor types in this market with identical preferences given by Ui(c1, c2) =
c0 − e−5c1 for i = 1, 2, where c0 denotes consumption at time 0 and c1 denotes consumption at
time 1. The investor types differ in their endowments in different states, being given as e1 =
(10, 0.4, 1.6, 1, 0) and e2 = (10, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.1). Such differences in endowments can occur due to
differences in demographics, geographical location, or lifecycle. Both investor types have the same
subjective probabilities for the four states given as P = (0.4, 0.1, 0.15, 0.35). Each investor solves
the decision problem specified in §3.2 in order to maximize total expected utility. Table 1 shows
the equilibrium investments and state prices of the investor types with and without constraints on
the short sale of primary securities by investors.
Suppose that there are three firms facing inventory decisions at time 0 as follows. Firm 1 has
random demand D1 = (1, 1, 0, 0) at time 1, firm 2 has demand D2 = (0, 0, 1, 0), and firm 3 has
demand D3 = (0, 0, 0, 1). The selling price is normalized to 1 and the per unit procurement prices
are r1, r2 and r3, respectively. We will consider different values of these prices, and thus, r1, r2 and
r3 will be specified later. The firms’ decisions are the amounts of inventory of the three products to
procure at time 0 in order to maximize the respective value to shareholders. If firm j buys inventory
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Table 1: Equilibrium consumption, investments, and state prices for the two investor types before
introduction of secondary securities
Equilibrium
demand
Investor for equity Consumptions State prices Expected
type (S1, S2) c0 c1 mik Utility
With short sales constraints:
1 (0.1474, 0) 9.8526 (0.5474, 1.6, (0.1295, 0.0002, 9.7100
1.0737, 0.2212) 0.0035, 0.5792)
2 (0, 0.1813) 9.8187 (0.6813, 0.1813, (0.0663, 0.2020, 9.6187
0.1813, 0.2813) 0.3030, 0.4288)
Without short sales constraints:
1 (1.0414, -1.1804) 10.1390 (0.2610, 0.4196, (0.5423, 0.0614, 9.9390
0.3403, 0.3817) 0.1368, 0.2595)
2 (-0.0785, 0.2544) 9.8241 (0.6759, 0.2544, (0.0681, 0.1401, 9.6241
0.2152, 0.2366) 0.2558, 0.5360)
αj , then the procurement price is αjrj and the cash flow at time 1 is Xj = min{αje4, Dj}, where
e4 = (1, 1, 1, 1). For example, if α1 = 0.5, then X1 = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0). These cash flows are unique to
the firms due to uniqueness of their products, customer base, or supply chain network.
This setting maps to our model since Xj can be interpreted as cash flows from the firms’ real
investment decisions with reservation prices αjrj . This is a simple example since D1 + D2 + D3
gives us the risk-free bond. Even so, it suffices to illustrate the values of reservation prices that
yield different pooled assets and different inventory decisions. We see that Xj are not spanned by
Θ for any positive value of inventory, and thus, do not have unique prices in this market. The
price bounds on X1 are [V −(X1), V +(X1)] = [0, α1], and on X2 and X3 are [0, α2/2] and [0, 2α3/3],
respectively. Therefore, if each firm considers its decision in isolation and use the lower bound
V −(Xj) as the measure of value, then its optimal inventory will be zero.
Before describing our solution, it is instructive to apply the CAPM to this example, similar to
Anvari (1987) for the case of complete markets. In the appendix, we present the valuations and
optimal inventory levels obtained from the CAPM. The results show that the CAPM yields present
values for the cash flows which do not agree with the state prices of any of the investors. This is so
because the CAPM implicitly assumes a unique pricing measure in the market. Therefore, a more
general approach such as ours that recognizes the existence of multiple pricing kernels in the market
and chooses a conservative valuation is necessary. In the rest of this section, we first illustrate the
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pure pooling solution, and then the pooling and tranching solution. The pure pooling solution does
not depend on the short sales constraint on investors, whereas the pooling and tranching solution
does.
Value of pure pooling. Clearly, not all values of r1, r2 and r3 will lead to value creation. The
optimal inventory quantity for each firm is zero if there is no value from pooling X1, X2, and X3
in any proportion. This condition is given by Theorem 1(i). Upon applying this theorem, we find
that there is no value from pooling if the reservation prices satisfy the following inequalities for
some a, b, c ∈ [0, 1]:
1
3
a+ b− r1 ≤ 0, 12c− r2 ≤ 0,
2
3
a+
1
2
c− r3 ≤ 0, a+ b+ c = 1. (11)
The optimal inventory quantity for the three firms is 1 unit each if there is value from pooling and
the pool is a grand coalition of the three products. This condition is given by Theorem 3. We
find that the grand coalition is sustainable if the reservation prices of the three assets satisfy the
following inequalities for some a, b, c ∈ [0, 1]:
1
3
a+ b− r1 ≥ 0, 12c− r2 ≥ 0,
2
3
a+
1
2
c− r3 ≥ 0, a+ b+ c = 1. (12)
If neither system of inequalities, (11) or (12), has a feasible solution, then there is value from
fractional pooling, i.e., the optimal inventory quantity is less than 1 for at least one firm.
To see these three solutions, we consider different values of reservation prices. Suppose that
r1 = 0.2, r2 = 0.3 and r3 = 0.52. Then, the system (11) is feasible, and thus, the optimal inventory
quantity is 0 for each firm. If r1 = 0.17, r2 = 0.33 and r3 = 0.45, then the system (12) is feasible,
and the optimal inventory quantity is 1 for each firm. The total value is 0.05, which can be divided
among the firms in such a way as to sustain the grand coalition. If r1 = 0.25, r2 = 0.4 and r3 = 0.25,
then neither system of inequalities is feasible, implying that there is value from pooling but the
grand coalition of the three products is not feasible. To find the maximal asset pool for these
reservation prices, we solve the LP given in Corollary 2:
max {z − 0.25α1 − 0.4α2 − 0.25α3 :
1/3α1 + 2/3α3 ≥ z, α1 ≥ z, 1/2α2 + 1/2α3 ≥ z, αj ∈ [0, 1] for all j} .
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Table 2: Optimal pooling and tranching solutions for different values of reservation prices when
the intermediary has access to investors of type 2 only
Optimal Tranches
Reservation Short sales inventory T a Tm T I Optimal
Case prices constraints (α1, α2, α3) (β1, β2) value
A 0.2, 0.3, 0.52 Yes (1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 2/3) (1/3, 0, 2/3, 0) 0.073
B 0.2, 0.3, 0.52 No (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.024
C 0.17, 0.33, 0.45 Yes (1, 1/3, 1) (0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 2/3) (1/3, 0, 0, 0) 0.161
D 0.17, 0.33, 0.45 No (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.124
E 0.25, 0.4, 0.25 Yes (1, 1/3, 1) (0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 2/3) (1/3, 0, 0, 0) 0.257
F 0.25, 0.4, 0.25 No (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.286
Note: The optimal inventory for each firm determines its cash flow, and thus, the total cash flow of the asset
pool. For the non-marketable tranches, T a and T I , the table shows cash flows in each of the four states. For the
marketable tranche, Tm, the table shows the weights, β1 and β2, of the two primary securities, S1 and S2. The
optimal value shown in the last column is net of the cost of procurement of inventory at respective reservation prices
of the firms.
Here, the decision variable αj is the amount of inventory to be purchased by firm j in the pool.
The optimal solution is α1 = 12 , α2 = 0, and α3 = 1, with an optimal value of
1
8 . The asset pool is
given by (12 ,
1
2 , 0, 0) + (0, 0, 0, 1) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 1). The convex combination,
1
4 of Q2 and
3
4 of Q3, yields
the pricing measure q = (14 , 0,
3
8 ,
3
8), under which Eq[X1] =
1
4 and Eq[X3] =
3
8 , both of which are
greater than or equal to the corresponding reservation prices. Thus, from Theorem 3 and Corollary
2, this fractional pool is sustainable. Thus, the optimal decisions are for firm 1 to buy 0.5 units,
firm 2 to buy 0, and firm 3 to buy 1 unit, with a total value of 18 .
Value of pooling and tranching. In Table 6, we present the optimal tranching solutions cor-
responding to the reservation prices discussed above. We show the results both with and without
constraints on short sales of primary securities by investors. In each case, we allow the intermedi-
ary to have access to investors of type 2 only. Thus, the intermediary can create tranches that are
marketable or those that are priced for investors of type 2, but not type 1. In the table, we show
the composition of the asset pool in the optimal solution, the structure of the tranches, and the
total value obtained. The value of m∗ is obtained from the state prices in Table 1 for all cases.
In cases A and B in Table 2, r1 = 0.2, r2 = 0.3, and r3 = 0.52. When no short sales by investors
are allowed, the optimal pooling and tranching solution gives the grand coalition of the three firms,
i.e., α = (1, 1, 1). The value of the solution is 0.073. Moreover, the dual solution to the pooling
and tranching problem is λ∗ = (0.066, 0.202, 0.303, 0.521). This gives
∑
k λ
∗
kXj(ωk) ≥ rj for all j.
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Thus, the grand coalition is sustainable. Table 2 shows that the optimal solution consists of all
three types of tranches, T a, Tm, and T I . When short sales by investors are allowed, the optimal
solution is α = (1, 0, 1) and we pool X1 and X3, with a value of 0.024. The dual solution to the
pooling and tranching problem is λ∗ = (0.068, 0.140, 0.256, 0.536). In this case,
∑
k λ
∗
kX2(ωk) < r2,
implying that firm 2’s optimal inventory amount is 0.
In cases C and D, the values of reservation prices are r1 = 0.17, r2 = 0.33, and r3 = 0.45. We find
that
∑
k λ
∗
kXJ(ωk) < rj for j = 2 both with and without short sales constraints on investors. Thus,
the grand coalition is not sustainable under pooling and tranching. With short sales constraints,
the optimal solution is α = (1, 1/3, 1), with a value of 0.161, and without short sales constraints, it
is a different pool, α = (1, 0, 1), with a value of 0.124. In cases E and F, the values of reservation
prices are r1 = 0.25, r2 = 0.4, and r3 = 0.25. Again, the grand coalition is not sustainable under
pooling and tranching both with and without short sales constraints, and we obtain results similar
to cases C and D.
In comparing pure pooling with pooling and tranching, we see that the latter yields a higher
value for each instance of reservation prices shown above. The optimal pool under tranching may
be larger or smaller than the optimal pool under pure pooling. In our example, it is larger in cases
A, B and E, but smaller in cases C, D and F. Note that the structure of the tranches corresponds
to Theorem 5(ii) in cases B, D and F, and Theorem 5(iii) in cases A, C and E. Similar results are
obtained when the intermediary has access to investors of type 1 only or to both investor types.
In summary, due to the interaction with the financial market, securitization through pooling
and tranching increases value and leads to a higher inventory procurement than if each firm had
considered its inventory decision in isolation. The exact solution depends on the reservation prices
since firms have to agree to join the coalition. While we considered simple inventory decisions, the
same concept and methodology can be applied for more complex operational decisions.
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7 Discussion
Securitization has become a large and rapidly growing industry since the 1970s, with trillions of
dollars of securitized assets. It has also come under criticism recently due to the events leading up
to the financial crisis and economic recession of 2008-09. Our paper does not seek to analyze the
practice of securitization, but studies the theoretical motivation for it. In this section, we reconcile
the results of our paper with the practical challenges of securitization and suggest directions for
future research.
One main result in our paper is that pooling and tranching are valuable in reducing ambiguity
surrounding the valuation of new real investments in incomplete markets. These ideas are applicable
to any operational decision, including, as we demonstrate, the newsvendor problem. Thus, the
focus of this paper differs from securitization in practice, which deals with existing financial assets,
and does not address new investment decisions. Further, our paper separately identifies the gains
due to pooling and tranching. It shows that pure pooling is valuable even in the absence of
tranching. In contrast, the implementation problems in securitization mostly deal with tranching
and the associated issues of distance and information asymmetry. Our results imply that, in the
simplest form, a large corporation could, instead of using a hurdle rate independently for each
project, consider its set of projects and their costs (i.e., reservation prices) jointly and see if there
are counter-balancing risks outside the marketed subspace that make the pool more valuable.
These relationships can be used in future empirical research to compare the optimal pool with real
investment decisions made by firms.
Another result of our paper relates to the construction of optimal tranches. In our optimal
solution, tranches are formed by partitioning the cash flows on a state-by-state basis. The states in
which a tranche has positive or zero cash flows are clearly defined. This contrasts with the practical
implementation of mortgage-backed securities, in which tranches are formed using a subordination
rule. Our tranches are categorized into three types that depend on spanning whereas the conven-
tional ones only consider default regardless of whether the states are spanned. The information
structure assumed by our model is simple and could be investigated in a practical setting. Addi-
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tionally, when there are different classes of investors with different marginal utilities, data for these
investor classes could be used to design optimal tranches.
The practical implementation of securitization requires consideration of moral hazard, which is
outside the scope of our model. In particular, Keys et al. (2008) analyze the subprime mortgage
loans market, and find evidence that securitization led to lax screening of borrowers. They remark
that the benefits of optimal securitization are limited by information loss in practice, but are not
negated by it. Others have commented on the lack of “skin in the game” by lenders as well as
other problems associated with rating agencies, regulation, and investors (Blinder (2007), Stiglitz
(2007)). In the theoretical literature, the problem of moral hazard has been addressed in models
of information asymmetry by requiring the issuer or financial intermediary to retain an equity
tranche on its books. This approach can be used in conjunction with our model. More generally,
in the literature, three sources of value from securitization have been identified—market frictions,
information asymmetry, and market incompleteness. Our paper addresses the third mechanism,
but all three mechanisms are important and are likely to occur in practice. Therefore, a practical
implementation may benefit from recognizing all of them.
Our paper can be extended and modified in subsequent research in other ways. First, while
the results in this paper are obtained under the strict definition of arbitrage, our analysis could
be combined with price bounds derived under approximate arbitrage as in the recent literature.
Under approximate arbitrage, market incompleteness should still continue to provide a rationale for
seeking value enhancement through pooling and tranching. However, the imposition of a constraint
that precludes “approximate arbitrage,” instead of arbitrage, would restrict the set of feasible
solutions to the optimization problems considered in this paper. Additional analysis is required to
determine the optimal pooling and tranching strategies when subjected to the tighter constraints.
Second, an interesting aspect of securitization is when the pool has to be created and managed
dynamically. This problem is commonly faced by private equity and venture fund managers. The
major differences are that firms within the pool might not have the option to leave the pool, while
firms that enter later might enjoy greater bargaining power. Further, firms and the intermediary
might have only an imperfect forecast about which assets will become available in the future. A
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third avenue for research is to compare the costs and benefits of alternative forms of financing
in incomplete markets. While we studied the benefits of pooling and tranching in securitization,
other types of financing may include issuance of new equity or debt. These alternatives may
be analyzed in a partial equilibrium setting such as ours or a general equilibrium setting where
investors are allowed to short sell the new assets so that the prices of existing assets in the market
may change. Finally, future empirical research may seek to quantify the benefits of securitization
for real investment decisions faced by firms in practice.
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Appendix
A. Application of the CAPM to the numerical example in §6
The application of the CAPM to our numerical example serves two purposes. It illustrates the
equivalence of our approach with the CAPM for the valuation of traded securities in the market.
It also shows that the CAPM does not lead to unambiguous definition of value for assets that are
outside the span of the market. Therefore, a more general approach such as ours is necessary.
To apply the CAPM, we need to translate it into a mean-variance setting. Therefore, we regress
the payoffs of the three new assets, X1, X2 and X3 on the payoffs of the two primary securities,
S1 and S2. The regression is done using minimum weighted least squares using the subjective
probabilities of the four states as weights. The intuitive explanation is that if we observed these
returns repeatedly, then the number of observations of each cash flow will be proportional to
the subjective probabilities. Thus, a regression on these historical returns would yield the same
equation.
Further, note that instead of a single-factor asset pricing model, we use a two-factor model
with S1 and S2 representing the two factors. S1 is a risk free bond in our example, but in general,
it need not be. This approach is described in Cochrane (2001: p.80-82). Usually, the factors in
a multi-factor model are proxies for aggregate consumption. Here, S1 and S2 represent only the
traded portion of aggregate consumption in our model. Thus, the application of the CAPM ignores
the non-traded portion of investors’ endowment; see Mayers (1973, 1976) for an extension of the
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CAPM to incorporate non-traded assets.
The regression results are functions of the inventory levels α1, α2 and α3. They are given by:
X1(α1) = 0.94α1S1 − 0.44α1S2 + error
X2(α2) = 0.48α2S1 − 0.33α2S2 + error
X3(α3) = −0.43α3S1 + 0.78α3S2 + error
Here, α1, α2, α3 ∈ [0, 1]. By definition, the residuals sum to zero. Therefore, the regression equations
give us the prices of X1, X2 and X3 at time 0 as functions of inventory levels, which can then be
used to compute the optimal inventory for each firm. For X1, we get the price of 0.5α1. Thus,
the optimal inventory level for firm 1 is 1 unit if the procurement price r1 is less than 0.5, and 0
otherwise. Likewise, the prices of X2 and X3 are 0.15α2 and 0.35α3, respectively. Thus, firm 2
would buy 1 unit of inventory if r2 < 0.15, and firm 3 would buy 1 unit of inventory if r3 < 0.35.
There are two problems with the above approach. First, the CAPM implies a unique pricing
measure. The above prices computed from the CAPM correspond to the pricing measure, (0.40,
0.10, 0.15, 0.35). This measure belongs to our set Θ, which is not surprising since the CAPM is
equivalent to our discount factor model for traded assets.11 However, its uniqueness is a strong
assumption since the market in our example is incomplete. In contrast to this assumption, our
analysis shows that there is an infinite number of pricing kernels admissible in the market, which
is why we conservatively uses the minimum value to price the untraded assets over the set of these
kernels.
Further, the pricing measure implied by the CAPM is not equal to the state prices of either
of the two investor types as shown in Table 1. This shows that investors may not agree with the
CAPM prices and will debate on prices since X1, X2 and X3 are outside the span of the market.
Therefore, the CAPM does not lead to an unambiguous definition of value for non-traded assets,
even though it gives a pricing measure consistent with our model and thus provides the same
11The existence of the pricing measure is noteworthy because the problem to find the pricing measure has three
unknowns (for four states) and five constraints (for the five securities), which may be an infeasible problem in general.
We also note that it is a coincidence that this pricing measure is equal to the subjective probability measure; this is
not true in general.
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valuation of traded assets.
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove part (i). The proof for part (ii) is similar. Consider the linear
program:
min
{
z : z ≥
K∑
k=1
ql(ωk)Z(ωk) ∀l = 1, . . . , L, z unsigned.
}
If z ≥ ∑k ql(ωk)Z(ωk) for all l, then ∑l δlz ≥ ∑l∑k δlql(ωk)Z(ωk) for all δl ≥ 0,∑l δl = 1.
Thus, z ≥ supq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)]. Therefore, the optimal solution to the linear program must be greater
than or equal to V +(Z). On the other hand, z = maxl∈LEql [Z] is a feasible solution to the linear
program. But maxl∈LEql [Z] ≤ supq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)]. Thus, V +(Z) = maxl∈LEql [Z].
For the proof of part (iii), consider the problem of maximizing the minimum marketable value
of a claim Z that pays Z(ωk) is state k.
max
{∑
n
αnpn :
∑
n
αnSn(ωk) ≤ Z(ωk) ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, αn unsigned ∀n = 1, . . . , N.
}
The objective is to maximize the market value of a portfolio of primary securities that pays less
cash flows than claim Z in every state k. The dual of this problem is given by:
min
{∑
k
λkZ(ωk) :
∑
k
λkSn(ωk) = pn ∀n = 1, . . . , N, λk ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . ,K.
}
We require that
∑
k λ
∗
kSn(ωk) = pn for every security n in the optimal dual solution. But this
condition, by definition, implies that the optimal dual solution is a pricing measure that belongs to
the set Θ. The proof follows by applying part (i) of the lemma. The validity of the upper bound
can be proven similarly. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove (i) of the theorem, we show the equivalent statement that if
value can be created by pooling, then there does not exist any q ∈ Θ such that Eq[Xj ] ≤ rj for all
j. Consider the linear program:
max
v −∑
j
αjrj : −
∑
k
ql(ωk)
∑
j
αjXj(ωk) + v ≤ 0 ∀l = 1, . . . , L, αj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , J.

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Here, the vector (αj) denotes the proportion in which the assets (Xj) are pooled together, and v
denotes the value of the asset pool in the securities market. The value of the asset pool is defined
as V −(
∑
j αjXj) because this is the minimum price that the asset pool commands in the securities
market. To compute the value of the asset pool, we have used Lemma 1, i.e., the expected value
under each extreme pricing measure, ql, should be greater than or equal to the value v. The first L
constraints correspond to these requirements. The linear program seeks to obtain the combination
of assets that will maximize the difference between its value v and the combination of reservation
prices required to create the asset pool,
∑
j αjrj .
If value can be created by pooling, then there exist weights αj such that the linear program is
feasible and
v −
∑
j
αjrj > 0. (13)
Let θl ≥ 0 be any set of weights such that
∑
l θl = 1. Multiply each of the L constraints with the
corresponding weight θl and add. Because the linear program is feasible, we get
−
∑
k
∑
l
θlql(ωk)
∑
j
αjXj(ωk)
+ v ≤ 0. (14)
Here,
∑
l θlql is a pricing measure in Θ, which we denote by q. Hence, (14) can be rewritten as
−Eq
∑
j
αjXj
+ v ≤ 0. (15)
Combining (13) and (15), we get Eq
[∑
j αjXj
]
>
∑
j αjrj . Equivalently, there exists j such that
Eq [Xj ] > rj .
Since θl are arbitrary and the pricing measures constructed using the set {(θl) : θl ≥ 0,
∑
l θl =
1} are a superset of Θ, we conclude that, if value can be created by pooling, then there does not
exist any q ∈ Θ such that Eq[Xj ] ≤ rj for all j.
To prove (ii), consider the dual of the above linear program. The dual variables µl will be
associated with each of the constraints related to the expected value under extreme pricing measure
ql. The dual problem is:
min
{
0 :
∑
l
µl = 1,
∑
k
∑
l
µlql(ωk)Xj(ωk) ≤ rj ∀j = 1, . . . , J, µl ≥ 0 ∀l = 1, . . . , L.
}
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We wish to show that if no value can be created by pooling, then there exists q ∈ Θ such that
Eq[Xj ] ≤ rj for all j. Notice that by choosing all αj = 0, the primal problem is always feasible
and has a lower bound of zero. The only question is whether the primal has a bounded solution –
which by strong duality theorem can only be zero from the dual program’s objective function – or
an unbounded solution. The former situation is the one where pooling does not create value (and
the dual is feasible), and the latter situation is the one where pooling leads to value creation (and
the dual is infeasible). Thus, if no value can be created by pooling, then the primal has a bounded
solution and the dual is feasible. From the dual constraints, we observe that dual feasibility implies
that there exist weights µl such that under the pricing measure
∑
l µlql, we have E[Xj ] ≤ rj for all
j. This proves the converse. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show the proof of this theorem for partitions where wj = 0 or 1
and then extend it to the case of fractional wj . Since we restrict wj to be 0 or 1, we denote the
cash flows for any subset Jw of J simply as
∑
j∈Jw Xj and the corresponding reservation prices as∑
j∈Jw rj .
The proof of part (i) of the theorem follows from the work of Owen (1975). We sketch the proof
for completeness. Consider the problem of maximizing the value of the portfolio formed from the
assets of coalition Jw by selling tranches of primary securities against it. The maximum value is
given by solving the linear program:
max
∑
n
βnpn :
∑
n
βnSn(ωk) ≤
∑
j∈Jw
Xj(ωk) ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, βn ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , N.

The dual to this problem is
min
∑
k
λk
∑
j∈Jw
Xj(ωk) :
∑
k
λkSn(ωk) ≥ pn ∀n = 1, . . . , N, λk ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . ,K.

Notice that the constraints to the dual program do not depend on the coalition formed because
the Xj ’s enter only the objective function. Moreover, the dual is feasible because the market is
arbitrage-free, that is, any q ∈ Θ will satisfy the dual constraints, i.e.,∑k qkSn(ωk) = pn, ∀n, q ∈ Θ.
Finally, as Xj(ωk) ≥ 0 for all j, the solution to the dual program is finite, as it cannot drop below
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zero. Solve the problem for the grand coalition of all firms and obtain the optimal dual solution λ∗k.
As Xj(ωk) ≥ 0 for all j, by applying the same reasoning as in Lemma 1(iii), we can also assume
that these dual values constitute a pricing measure in Θ.
Consider the following solution to the cooperative game: Let firm j receive the payment∑
k λ
∗
kXj(ωk). This is surely greater than or equal to V
−(Xj), and therefore, by assumption,
larger than rj . By definition, the coalition Jw receives the sum of the payments to the firms in the
coalition. This sum equals or exceeds the maximum value obtained by solving the linear program
for just the coalition because: (a) the λ∗k’s constitute a dual feasible solution to the problem for
all Jw ⊆ J because, as noted earlier, the constraints of the dual problem do not depend on the
coalition formed; and (b) all dual feasible solutions are greater than or equal to the primal optimal
solution (by weak duality). This proves part (i).
For the proof of part (ii), the problem is to demonstrate the existence of a payment scheme that
works for all coalitions simultaneously. Redefine the value of a coalition without loss of generality to
be V (Jw) = max(V −(Jw),
∑
j∈Jw rj). We first show that if the condition stated in part (ii) applies
to partitions comprised of two subsets, then it also applies to any arbitrary partition. That is, if
for every subset Jw of J , we have V (J) ≥ max(V (Jw),
∑
j∈Jα rj) + max(V (J
c
w),
∑
j∈Jcw rj), then for
every partition J1, J2, . . . , Jk of J , the same inequalities hold. (Note that the reverse statement can
also be proven, implying that the two conditions are equivalent.) The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that the condition does not hold for some partition, J1, J2, . . . , Jk. Thus, by assumption,
V (J) <
∑
i
max
V −(Ji),∑
j∈Ji
rj
 .
Without loss of generality, assume that for i = 1, 2, . . . . , h, max(V −(Ji),
∑
j∈Ji rj) = V
−(Ji), and
for i = h + 1, h + 2, . . . . , k, max(V −(Ji),
∑
j∈Ji rj) =
∑
j∈Ji rj . Then, by super-additivity of the
value function (which follows from the definition of V −),
V −
(
h⋃
i=1
Ji
)
≥
h∑
i=1
V −(Ji).
Let Jw =
⋃h
i=1 Ji. By the condition given in part (ii) of Theorem 2, the definition of V (·), and the
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discussion above, we have
V (J) ≥ V (Jw) + V (Jcw)
≥
i=h∑
i=1
V −(Ji) +
k∑
j=h+1
∑
j∈Ji
rj
=
∑
i
max(V −(Ji),
∑
j∈Ji
rj).
This provides the necessary contradiction. The proof of part (ii) now appears to be immediate
because, under every solution in the core, each coalition Jw gets at least max(V (Jw),
∑
j∈Jw rj).
Thus, the payment is sufficient to cover the reservation price. However, it must further be shown
that this can be done simultaneously for every coalition and not just coalition by coalition.
Consider the primal problem:
min 0
subject to
∑
j∈Jw
pij ≥ V (Jw), for all Jw ⊆ J,∑
j
pij = V (J),
pij ≥ 0, for all j.
This program if feasible determines the payment schedule for the firms, i.e., firm j receives a
payment pij . The dual problem is:
max
∑
Jw⊆J
λJwV (Jw) + λV (J)
subject to
∑
Jw:j∈Jw
λJw + λ ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , J,
λJw ≥ 0, λ unsigned.
The dual variables λJw correspond to the first set of constraints in the primal problem, and the
dual variable λ corresponds to the second constraint. Obviously, the dual problem is always feasible
(set all variables equal to zero). The dual solution will equal zero. Moreover, λ has to be less than
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or equal to zero. All we need to show is that zero is the maximum possible solution to the dual. If
not, then the dual will be unbounded (by scaling all variables as large as desired), and therefore,
the primal will be infeasible. We proceed to show that the solution to the dual problem is bounded.
Consider the constraint to the dual corresponding to j = 1. This constraint along with λ ≤ 0
implies that: ∑
Jw:1∈Jw
λJwV (Jw) + λmax(V (Jw) : 1 ∈ Jw, Jw ⊆ J) ≤ 0.
Similarly, the constraint corresponding to j = 2 yields
∑
Jw:2∈Jw and 1∈Jcw
λJwV (Jw) + λmax (V (Jw) : 2 ∈ Jw and 1 ∈ Jcw, Jw ⊆ J) ≤ 0.
We can write analogous inequalities for larger values of j. In general, we have
∑
Jw:j∈Jw and {1,...,j−1}⊆Jcw
λJwV (Jw) +λmax (V (Jw) : j ∈ Jw and {1, . . . , j − 1} ⊆ Jcw, Jw ⊆ J) ≤ 0.
The sets where the maximum is attained over (Jw : j ∈ Jw and {1, . . . , j − 1} ⊆ Jcw, Jw ⊆ J) are
disjoint and their union is less than or equal to J . Adding up these inequalities gives
∑
Jw⊆J
λJwV (Jw)+λ(max(V (Jw) : 1 ∈ Jw, Jw ⊆ J)+max (V (Jw) : 2 ∈ Jw and 1 ∈ Jcw, Jw ⊆ J)+. . .) ≤ 0.
Recalling that V (J) is greater than equal to the sum of the V (Ji)’s over any partition of J we
obtain ∑
Jw⊆J
λJwV (Jw) + λV (J) ≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of the dual problem is bounded above by zero. This implies that the
dual problem is feasible and bounded, and therefore, has an optimal solution. Therefore, by strong
duality theorem, the primal has a feasible solution.
This proves the theorem for wj = 0 or 1 for all j. The same proof applies for the case of
fractional wj when the number of subdivisions of each asset is finite. Thus, if each asset is broken
into a finite number of parts, treating each subdivided asset as a ‘undivided’ asset we get the result.
2
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Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a partition of the assets, such that one coalition pools
∑
j wjXj
with a reservation price of
∑
j wjrj and the other coalition pools
∑
j(1−wj)Xj with a reservation
price of
∑
j(1 − wj)rj . By assumption,
∑
j EqlwjXj ≥
∑
j wjrj , and by definition
∑
j EqlwjXj ≥
V −(
∑
j wjXj). Thus,
∑
j EqlwjXj ≥ max(
∑
j wjrj , V
−(
∑
j wjXj)). Similarly,
∑
j Eql(1−wj)Xj ≥
max(
∑
j(1− wj)rj , V −(
∑
j(1− wj)Xj)). Adding these, we get
V −
∑
j
Xj
 ≥ max
V −(∑
j
wjXj),
∑
j
wjrj
+ max
V −(∑
j
(1− wj)Xj),
∑
j
(1− wj)rj
 .
This proves the sufficiency part of the theorem.
For the necessity part, suppose that the solution with wj = 1 for all j is in the core, but the
condition in Theorem 3 does not hold, i.e., for each q ∈ Θ that achieves V −(∑j Xj), there exists a
firm j such that Eq[Xj ] < rj . Consider the following linear program:
max v −
∑
j
wjrj
subject to
v −
∑
j
wjEql(Xj) ≤ 0 for all l,
wj ≤ 1 for all j,
v unsigned, wj ≥ 0 for all j.
This LP seeks the optimal fractions (wj ∈ [0, 1]) of all assets Xj to construct the asset pool if we
can buy the claim wjXj for the reservation price wjrj and the objective is to maximize the value
of the pool. The ql are the extreme risk-neutral pricing measures. The dual program is
min
∑
j
γj
subject to
∑
l
λl = 1,
−
∑
l
λlEql(Xj) + γj ≥ − rj for all j,
γj , λl ≥ 0 for all j, l.
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In this formulation, the λl’s are the dual variables corresponding to the first set of primal constraints,
and the γj ’s are the dual variables corresponding to the second set of primal constraints. Suppose
that the optimal solution to the dual problem is achieved at some values λ∗l , γ
∗
j . Let q
∗ ∈ Θ be
such that
∑
l λ
∗
l ql = q
∗. By assumption, the optimal solution to the primal problem is w∗j = 1 for
all j, and v∗ = V −(
∑
j Xj) −
∑
j rj . By complementary slackness applied to w
∗
j variables, we get
that the second constraint in the dual problem must be binding for all j in the optimal solution.
Thus, we have γ∗j = Eq∗ [Xj ] − rj for all j, and since γ∗j ≥ 0, we further have Eq∗ [Xj ] ≥ rj for
all j. Thus, the optimal solution to the dual problem is Eq∗ [
∑
j Xj ] −
∑
j rj . Equating this to
the optimal primal solution, we get that q∗ achieves the lower bound on the price of the pool, i.e.,
Eq∗ [
∑
j Xj ] = V
−(
∑
j Xj). By assumption, this implies that there must be some firm j
∗ for which
the second constraint in the dual problem has a slack, i.e., Eq∗(Xj∗) < rj∗ . However, this gives a
contradiction, and thus, proves the necessity part of the theorem. 2
Proof of Corollary 1. The choice of qp in part (i) follows from Lemma 1. Notice that when
the lower bound, V −(
∑
j Xj), is achieved at several extreme points then a linear mixture of these
measures also gives the same lower bound. The second part follows from part (ii) of Theorem 2.
To see this, the optimal solution to the grand coalition’s problem is the highest value that can be
obtained by pooling all assets, which must equal Eqp(
∑
j Xj). Moreover, any linear pricing measure
that supports the core must be an optimal dual solution to the problem of determining V −(
∑
j Xj).
Also, all optimal solutions to the dual problem are obtained as convex combinations of the optimal
extreme points solutions. Thus, if one such pricing measure can be found that not only supports
the core but also gives a value of each Xj larger than rj , then all firms will willingly participate in
creation of the pool. 2
Proof of Corollary 2. The value is maximized because this is the highest surplus that can be
generated after meeting all the reservation prices. The set of projects financed is maximal because
if another project could be added to the set with an increase to the objective function then the
current solution is not optimal.
Let q be the measure under which the pooled assets attain their minimal value. Then, if asset
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j is at a positive level in the pool then, EqXj > rj otherwise the dual constraint of the form
−EqXj + γ > −rj will have slack, which will mean that the asset j is at zero level in the primal
solution. Also, the set of assets wjXj satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.
To show that the remaining assets cannot be pooled to create value, observe that under the
extreme pricing measure that minimizes the value of the pooled fractions of assets, the expected
value of the unpooled fractions of each asset is below its reservation price. Thus, applying Theorem
1(i) we get the result. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. We first note that the dual problem DT (J) has a feasible solution located
in the bounded convex set given by the intersection of the set of feasible region of problem DT (J)
and B = ∏k[0,max(1,maxkm∗k)] × [0,max(1,maxkm∗k)]. The proof of this assertion follows from
the fact that qk ≤ 1, so that we may bound the region in which we search for a feasible solution by
a hypercube that contains the largest values of λk and δk.
The proof of Lemma 2 now follows from the facts that the optimal dual solution is bounded
above by a feasible solution in B, and that the minimum is attained at an extreme point of B⋂SDT
(cf: Lemma 1). 2
Proof of Theorem 4. (i) Assume to the contrary that there exists a solution to the dual problem,
DT (J), in Θ. This solution must be obtained by setting δ = 0 and λ = q for some q ∈ Θ. Since
the solution must satisfy all the dual constraints, multiplying constraints (7) by Z(ωk) and adding,
we get
∑
k λkZ(ωk) ≥
∑
km
∗
kZ(ωk). However, this gives a contradiction because
∑
k λkZ(ωk) =∑
k qkZ(ωk) < V
+(Z). Therefore, there is no feasible solution to the dual problem in Θ. Further,
since λ /∈ Θ, we must have δk > 0 in some state k, so that Ωa 6= ∅.
(ii) Assume to the contrary that there exists a non-negative contingent claim Z such that∑
km
∗
kZ(ωk) > V
+(Z) but which is zero in all states in Ωa. Let (λ∗k, δ
∗
k) denote the optimal
solution of the dual problem. Because Z(ωk) = 0 for all k ∈ Ωa, we can set m∗k = 0 for these states.
Since δ∗k = 0 for all k solves the dual problem with Z as the asset pool, we have a feasible λ ∈ Θ.
Thus, applying the same step as in the proof of (i) above, we find that
∑
k λkZ(ωk) ≥
∑
km
∗
kZ(ωk),
which contradicts the assertion that
∑
km
∗
kZ(ωk) > V
+(Z). This proves the result.
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(iii) Consider a modified primal problem where we drop the lk variables and the corresponding
constraints for k ∈ Ωa. Correspondingly, in the dual problem, we drop the variables δk and the
constraints δk ≤ m∗k for k ∈ Ωa. Note that the modified primal problem is always feasible, but the
modified dual problem is infeasible. Thus, the primal problem must be unbounded. This implies
that there is a marketable portfolio with cash flows that are used only in the states Ωa that can be
shorted to create non-marketable tranches to be sold to investors, and yields infinite profit.
(iv) As before, let Z ′ be the marketable security that gives the upper bound on Z. Arguing as
before, we get Eq[Z ′] < Em∗ [Z ′] for all q ∈ Θ. However, because Z ′ ≥ 0, if there is a q ≥ m∗, this
leads to a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 5. (i) The proof of this part follows from Theorem 4(iv). If there exists
q ∈ Θ such that qk ≥ m∗k for all k, then the set Ωa is empty. Thus, by definition of T a, we obtain
that T a is zero in all states in the optimal solution.
(ii) If there exists q ∈ Θ such that qk ≤ m∗k for all k and qk < m∗k for some k, then consider
the solution to the dual problem, DT (J), obtained by setting λk = m∗k and δk ≥ 0 for all k. This
solution is feasible and yields an objective function value of
∑
km
∗
k
(∑
j wjXj(ωk)
)
. Also consider
the solution to the primal problem, V T (J), given by Yk =
∑
j wjXj(ωk) for all k, lk = 0 for all k,
and βn = 0 for all n. This also gives an objective function value of
∑
km
∗
k
(∑
j wjXj(ωk)
)
. Since
the primal objective function value is equal to the dual objective function value, these solutions are
optimal. Therefore, there exists an optimal tranching solution in which Tm = T I = 0.
(iii) This case is the complement of the possibilities covered in (i) and (ii). Hence, the proof
follows. 2
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